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A
t China’s 2006 National Science
and Technology Conference,
President Hu Jintao pledged to
make 21st-century China “an innova-
tion-oriented society.” To that end, the
conference unveiled a 15-year Medium
to Long-Term Science and Technology
Development Plan (MLP) (2006–2020)
setting national research priorities and
providing substantial resources for
meeting them. Gross expenditures on
R&D (GERD) are expected to rise to
2.5% of the gross domestic product
(GDP) at the end of the plan period from
its 2005 level of 1.30% (1). The plan
emphasizes “indigenous innovation,”
and “leapfrogging” in research. Science
and technology are expected to support and
lead future economic growth. 
Behind this new plan is a complex story of
20 years of policy development and institu-
tional reform. This is illustrated in the experi-
ences of the Chinese Academy of Sciences
(CAS) and its efforts to reinvent itself through
the “Knowledge Innovation Program” (KIP)
(2). A review of CAS can help explain forces
driving the scientific infrastructure and chal-
lenges in the new long-term plan. 
Objectives and Achievements
In 1998, when KIP was initiated, CAS
supported 120 institutes, many of which had
overlapping missions and outdated research
agendas. Most institutes were overstaffed with
nonresearch personnel and had more than their
share of scientists who had passed their peak
productivity and lagged behind international
research frontiers. Research programs were
often derivative of foreign science, physical
facilities were typically run down, and the
quality of equipment was very uneven. To
attack these problems, one of KIP’s main goals
is creation of 30 internationally recognized
research institutes by 2010, with five recognized
as world leaders.
Between 1998 and 2005 the number of
institutes was scaled back to 89 as a result of
converting some applied research institutes
into commercial entities and the reorganization
of others to reduce duplication and rationalize
missions. At individual institutes, traditional
disciplinary orientations and missions have
been redefined and more focused.
Revitalization of the human resource base
in CAS has been approached by recruitment
of talented group and laboratory leaders
from “brain drain” scientists working abroad
and from young researchers in China. The
“100 Talents” Program, for instance, offers
high salaries, responsible positions, and
generous start-up research support to
promising scientists under 45 years old (3).
Between 1998 and 2004, 899 researchers
were recruited using this mechanism, 778 of
whom were working overseas (392 of these
had doctorates from foreign universities). The
academy also expanded its graduate training,
with total enrollment as of the end of 2004
reaching some 33,000 at its institutes, its
graduate school, and its University of Science
and Technology campus. A CAS university
center in Beijing is now under construction.
The average age of institute directors and
deputy directors in 1991 has dropped from
56 in 1991 to 47 in 2003. Between 1998 and
2003, CAS made 14,409 new appointments,
67.8% of whom were senior scientists under
the age of 45 (4). New appointments no longer
carry promises of lifetime tenure but are
subject to evaluation early in the investigator’s
career. Salary structures have also changed and
now include provisions for merit increases.
In the past 7 years, KIP has provided project
support in fundamental research, technologies
with strategic significance, and science and
technology for managing resources and the envi-
ronment. The pattern of KIP fund-
ing, with 70% going directly to insti-
tutes and 30% controlled by CAS
headquarters, has given institutes
considerably more discretion in
research management. Additions of
KIP funds to institute budgets have
made CAS institutes more competi-
tive vis-à-vis universities and other
government research institutes for
grants and contracts. CAS research
outputs (publications in Science
Citation Index–catalogued journals,
patents granted, and copyrights regis-
tered) have increased by more than an
order of magnitude.
KIP implementation has been
accompanied by the introduction of a demand-
ing evaluation system. It involves administra-
tive reviews to assess the consistency of insti-
tute activity with CAS policy and KIP objec-
tives, as well as peer review of professional
work by leading Chinese and foreign scien-
tists. There has also been a major investment
in upgrading facilities and equipment. CAS
manages most of China’s megascience facili-
ties, and substantial investments are shown
by the construction of the Large Sky Area
Multi-Object Fiber Spectroscopic Telescope
(LAMOST) astronomical telescope; the re-
construction of the Beijing Electron Positron
Collider (BEPC); the Lanzhou Heavy Ion
Accelerator; the Synchrotron Radiation Facility
and the Controlled Nuclear Fusion Device, both
in Hefei; and construction of the Shanghai
Synchrotron Radiation Facility. CAS also con-
tinues to play a key role in China’s defense estab-
lishment, participating in everything from the
space program to supercomputer development.
The Challenges Ahead
During the 2005–2010 period, CAS seeks to
respond to emerging national policy priorities,
including those identified in the national 11th
Five-Year Plan and the new MLP, and secure its
place as the “backbone” of the national system
of innovation. To these ends, it is establishing a
“1+10” strategy, in which activities of its
research institutes will be linked to 10 mission
objectives (see table, above). A commitment to
interdisciplinary basic research in frontier
areas will support the effort. This strategy
requires administrative reorganization within
CAS that will have implications for relations
between the institutes and CAS leadership.
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Human resources. Although CAS has
sought to recruit the very best scientific talent,
its success has been mixed. Some Chinese
scientists working abroad have joint appoint-
ments in CAS, but it has been difficult to
attract back on a permanent basis those who
are most active at the frontiers of interna-
tional science. Indeed, it is the latter group of
scientists that has become more vocal in
their criticisms of the Chinese research
environment (5–7). In addition, CAS is still
losing many of its top students to study and
research opportunities abroad and to alterna-
tive employment opportunities in China,
including work in universities and in the
growing number of R&D facilities operated
by multinational corporations. Within the
CAS graduate school system, the steady
expansion of enrollment brings to the fore the
question of maintaining quality control (8).
High-quality Chinese researchers expect
a degree of stability and autonomy in the
research environment and worry that the new
initiatives could be a threat. The evaluation
system, especially for new group leaders,
generates enormous pressures for productivity.
In some cases, this pressure has caused
promising scientists to leave CAS for
employment elsewhere.
Different types of evaluation standards
and processes will need to be developed.
CAS aspirations to achieve world-class
research status will put a premium on scien-
tif ic distinction. However, with increased
funding, CAS faces new problems of political
accountability and government expectations
that national needs are being served cost-
effectively. This may require evaluation to
focus more on consistency with national policy
and on the extent to which social needs are
met. Imposition of excessive top-down
requirements on the research community
could discourage creativity and bottom-up
innovation. A failure to fine-tune the evaluation
system to meet multiple objectives may lead
to dissatisfaction from all quarters.
Institutional mission and focus. Few insti-
tutions in the world incorporate in one
organizational framework so many different
activities and goals: basic research; cutting-
edge R&D; “public goods” research programs
in agriculture, health, energy, and the envi-
ronment; sponsorship of graduate training;
and operation of more than 400 hundred
companies, in cooperation with local govern-
ments. Finally, its elite “academicians”
(yuanshi) have important science advisory
functions, although publicized abuses have
made the system increasingly controversial
(9). The multiple functions that CAS assumes
can threaten maintenance of clear organiza-
tional focus. A case might be made for greater
specialization and functional differentiation
within the organization. 
CAS and the National System of Innovation
(NIS). As China has moved from a planned to a
market economy, there is a growing realization
among policy-makers that Chinese industry
must become far more innovative. As a result,
government policy has recently favored the
expanded development of research in business
enterprises, with more than 60% of the nation’s
R&D reportedly now supported by industry
(10). The importance of building an “enterprise-
centered NIS” was reaffirmed in the MLP, and
proindustry policy measures will be introduced
to make it a reality over the next 15 years.
CAS is faced with the challenge of recon-
ciling its view of itself as the backbone of the
nation’s innovation system with this “enter-
prise-centered” model. On the basis of current
trends, it is unlikely that many Chinese compa-
nies will develop R&D capabilities in support
of novel, science-based technologies in the
near term. China’s more entrepreneurial high-
technology companies often lack resources to
support their own R&D. Larger state-owned
enterprises often find that short-term business
objectives are better met by the less risky
course of procuring advanced technology from
abroad. CAS represents a reservoir of assets
for research and innovation. How it makes
these assets available to the companies that
will actually be marketing products and serv-
ices is one of the major challenges in making
the “innovation-oriented society” a reality.
Although, historically, CAS has been
weak in its service to industry, the commer-
cial pressures it has faced over the past 20
years have produced a variety of transfer
mechanisms. These include contract research,
the licensing of proprietary technologies, the
spinning off of new companies from CAS
institutes, and the establishment of CAS
facilities to serve industry in special high-
technology zones established by local govern-
ments (11). However, problems still remain.
There are often mismatches between the rela-
tively advanced technologies being developed
by CAS and the willingness and ability of
Chinese companies to adopt them. Some CAS
researchers are concerned that industrial out-
reach takes the academy too far downstream
(and away from its core strengths) in the inno-
vation process. 
Public goods (e.g., public health, agriculture,
defense, weather forecasting, and environmental
protection) require technology transfer plat-
forms that involve cooperation with other state
bureaucratic systems (that have their own
research establishments and actually compete
for funding with CAS). Relations with local
governments may be useful, but they are no sub-
stitute for deployment of substantial managerial
resources and interagency coordination. Too
much involvement with local governments is
seen by some in CAS as diverting attention away
from its broader, national mission.
Chinese universities had a limited research
role in the past, but the value of associating
research with graduate education, characteristic
of the Western model, has taken root. The
role of CAS in relation to universities has
become a more pressing issue, especially
with regard to sharing of facilities and staff,
training and subsequent employment of
graduate students, and leadership roles in
high priority areas of research. 
CAS faces a series of questions as it
moves to the next phase of KIP. Do its
strategies (including funding and evaluation
systems) encourage development of a culture
of creativity where risk-taking, initiative,
and new ideas are supported and rewarded?
Can CAS develop R&D managers with the
skills and training for managing interdisci-
plinary teams in an increasingly interna-
tional environment? How should CAS set
priorities related to its stakeholders, and
develop an organizational structure that fits
diverse needs? Should it define its mission
principally in terms of the supply of public
or private goods, and how does it def ine
“success”? How can its educational mission
meet its own needs and complement the
activities of Chinese universities? In its
commitment to serve national needs, can it
also be a credible international partner? In
its efforts to reinvent itself, CAS still faces
formidable problems of internal manage-
ment and building new relations with the
broader national innovation system. Despite
these, the trajectory set by KIP helps ensure
a central role for CAS in China’s emergence
as a major player in international research
and innovation. 
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